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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastelemme linkitetyn työntekijä-työnantaja -aineiston avulla henkilöstön 
rekrytointeja sekä työsuhteen päättymisiä Suomessa aikavälillä 1990-2004. Aineisto mahdollistaa 
yritystason tarkastelun edellisvuoden aikana rekrytoitujen ja yrityksestä lähteneiden työntekijöiden 
kehityksestä. Iän mukaista eriytymistä tarkastellaan sekä segregaatiokäyrien että Gini-kertoimien 
avulla. Ikääntyneiden työntekijöiden rekrytoinnit ovat yritysten kesken selvästi epätasaisemmin 
jakautuneita kuin vastaavan ikäisten työsuhteiden päättymiset ja työllisten määrä. Ikäsegregaatio 
uuden työvoiman palkkaamisessa on kuitenkin hieman lieventynyt tarkastelukauden loppua kohti 
samalla kun se on lisääntynyt työsuhteiden päättymisten ja työllisten määrän kohdalla. Tulokset 
saavat vahvistusta lisätarkasteluista, joissa segregaation mittausmenetelmän mahdolliset ongelmat 
erityisesti pienten yritysten kohdalla tulevat huomioiduiksi. Tarkasteltaessa rekrytointeja ja työ-
suhteiden päättymisiä aggregaattiaineistolla havaitaan, että vanhimman ikäryhmän rekrytointi-
osuudet alittavat ko. ryhmän työntekijäosuudet. Heidän rekrytointiosuutensa kasvussa heijastuu 
ikääntyneiden työntekijöiden lukumäärän kasvu tarkasteluajanjakson loppua kohti, mutta tämä 
osuuden kasvu jää kuitenkin vaatimattomammaksi kuin ikäryhmän työllisyysosuuden nousu. 
Suhdannevaihtelut heijastuvat ikääntyneiden kohdalla työsuhteiden päättymisessä mutta eivät rekry-
toinneissa. Jaamme lisäksi eri ajankohtina ikäluokkien työllisasteen muutoksen osiin siten, että ero-
tamme siinä toisistaan rekrytointien, työsuhteiden päättymisen ja toisaalta ikäkohorttien koko- ja 
työllisyysaste-erojen vaikutukset. Lopuksi mallitamme ikääntyneiden rekrytointeja regressioana-
lyysin avulla. Tulosten mukaan rekrytointiaste jää suurimmissa yrityksissä jälkeen pienemmistä yri-
tyksistä, joskin yrityksen koon kasvu lisää luonnollisesti todennäköisyyttä sille, että yritys ylipää-
tään palkkaa vanhemman työntekijän.  
ABSTRACT 
We analyse age segregation in hirings and separations using linked employer-employee data from 
Finland in the period 1990-2004. This allows us to identify at the firm level employees in different 
age groups that have been hired during the previous year, and employees who have exited the firms. 
We analyze firm-level age segregation using segregation curves and Gini indices. The main result is 
that hirings of older employees have clearly been more segregated than exits or the stock of old 
employees even though hirings have become slightly less segregated towards the end of the period 
in question. At the same time age segregation in exits and stocks has increased and these trends are 
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not sensitive to small unit bias in measurement. We also examine trends in hiring and exit rates 
using aggregate data. According to our results the oldest age group is again underrepresented in 
hirings. There is a positive upward trend in their recruitments related to the increasing cohort size, 
but it is much weaker than the trend in the relative share of older workers in employment. The exit 
rate of the older employees indicates cyclical variation while the small number of hirings seems to 
be insensitive to changing labour demand. We present a decomposition of employment change by 
age group and with that decomposition we disentangle the role of hirings and exits from factors 
related to demographics and cohort effects. The latter factors include the effect of the large baby-
boom generation entering the age group of older employees with higher employment rates than 
earlier cohorts. Finally, our regression analysis shows that larger firms are more likely to hire older 
employees, but their hiring rates are lower.  
Key words: ageing, hiring, segregation, labour demand 
JEL codes: J14, J23, J26 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The existing empirical evidence indicates that older employees are less likely to change jobs 
compared to their younger counterparts, and they are also less likely to become re-employed once 
unemployed. This scarcity of hirings among older workers actually seems to be a rather universal 
phenomenon, and this universality makes it interesting per se. However, the ageing of the work 
force makes it also increasingly policy-relevant. 
When the average age of the labour force is increasing, older workers are becoming a more 
important source of recruitment. Accordingly, firms have to pay increasing attention to their 
recruitment policies towards older employees. Also from policy perspective it is important to 
understand the reasons for the reluctance of the firms to hire older employees. In other words, the 
choice of policy depends also on the nature of barriers to recruit senior workers.  
There are competing explanations for scarce recruitments. In the market based explanation the 
reluctance may arise because of fixed hiring costs and their short payback period in the case of 
older employees. Senior employees may also have wage expectations that exceed their productivity 
due to e.g. deferred compensation pay schemes. A further explanation is statistical discrimination 
where the productivity of possible recruits is evaluated based on the average (observed or assumed) 
productivity of older employees. On the other hand, the reasons for scarce recruitments may relate 
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to labour market and pension policies that have harmful side effects. As an example one can 
consider pension plans that raise the costs of older employees above those of younger ones. The 
nature of optimal policy changes is naturally different depending on the underlying reason for 
scarce recruitments. 
We will examine long-term changes in the hiring of older employees over a period of time from the 
beginning of 1990s to the mid-2000s in Finland. In particular, we examine how age segregated the 
workplaces are in terms of hiring, exits, and the stock of employees. We also decompose the rate of 
change in employment of different age groups to their hiring and separation rates and a cohort size 
effect and examine their relative importance. Special emphasis is given to the relationship between 
firm size and hiring of older employees. 
We proceed by first reviewing the earlier literature on employment opportunities of older workers 
in Section 2 and policy changes in Section 3. Section 4 then explains the data we use and Section 5 
presents descriptive evidence on firm-level age segregation. Section 6 analyses aggregate trends in 
the hirings and exits of older workers and we present regression results on the determinants of 
hiring in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. EARLIER RESEARCH ON THE JOB OPPORTUNITIES  
 OF OLDER WORKERS 
The descriptive work has typically considered the age segregation of hiring compared e.g. to the age 
segregation of existing employees (e.g. Hutchens 1988; Hirsch et al. 2000; Disney et al. 2006). The 
underlying question is whether and to what extent the job opportunities of older workers are 
restricted compared to prime-age workers. The analysis is typically carried out at the occupational 
or sectoral level so that the location of the most severe entry barriers can be detected. The results 
typically support the preconceptions that occupational segregation is substantially greater for older 
hires than for either young hires or employment among all older workers. This implies, among other 
things, that after major negative macroeconomic shocks the displaced older workers have more 
limited options of re-entry available. 
The widely asked question in the literature follows from these empirical observations: why the 
firms hire older workers so seldom even though their existing personnel may consist of older 
employees to a large extent? The theoretical explanations for the firms’ reluctance to hire older 
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employees propose two underlying mechanisms. The first puts the emphasis on training and fixed 
costs, while the second puts stress on the nature of optimal labour contracts, especially the so-called 
back-loaded compensation structures. The latter explanation is then closely connected to the 
optimal shapes of the age-wage profiles. 
The older employees are likely to have a fair amount of work experience and also firm-specific 
knowledge. Once they are e.g. displaced from their current job, firm-specific knowledge loses its 
value. It has been even argued that the “managerial culture” they have inherited from their previous 
work place can actually be a burden from the point of view of the potential new employer 
(Heywood and Siebert 2009). Anyhow, potential new jobs require new firm-specific training and 
the fixed costs related to training need to be covered. Here comes the disadvantage of older 
employees compared to younger recruits: hiring the older employee makes the returns to specific 
training lower. These returns can be collected only for a relatively short period, because of the short 
remaining work career of the older employee. The negative relationship between the intensity of 
training and hiring opportunities of older employees is also verified in several empirical studies 
(e.g. Disney et al. 2009; Adams and Heywood 2007; Hu 2003). 
A very basic element of the hiring barrier is so-called productivity compensation deficit when 
workers age (Munnell and Sass 2008). While the wage profiles are typically raising or relatively flat 
even among the oldest, productivity is likely to increase at a slower rate with age or even fall in the 
same age groups. This clearly forms a disincentive to hiring of older employees. These phenomena 
have given motivation to the theories that aim at explaining the form of the wage profile which 
seems to contradict the changes in productivity by age. The origins of these theories are in delayed 
compensation schemes as formulated by Lazear (1979). There the motivation for rising wage 
profiles is the embedded incentive structure aiming at long tenures and good work performance. A 
rising wage profile gives the recruits an incentive to perform efficiently (even without heavy 
monitoring efforts) in order not to miss the opportunities for rising wages in the coming periods. It 
is also in their interests to stay with the firm long enough in order to be able to pick up the fruits of 
good work performance. 
Hutchens (1986) developed these ideas further by stating that the implied “delayed payment” 
contracts also introduce fixed costs (similar to hiring and training costs) into the employment 
relationship: the firm needs to pay an extra wage premium because in the case of delayed payment 
the employee faces the risk that the firm cheats (e.g. in the form of ending the employment 
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relationship unilaterally). These kinds of fixed costs also make the firms minimize hiring and favour 
long tenures and they also make young recruits more desirable than the older ones. 
While these recruitment strategies may be rational from the point of view of the firms, they make 
the hiring prospects for older employees less favourable. For instance, it is not profitable for the 
firm to offer the new old recruits the same wage the existing older employees within the firm have. 
On the other hand, offering a wage too different from the existing wage level may harm the work 
performance of the newcomers. This contradiction is likely to result in the firm choosing young 
recruits instead of old ones. Since the introduction of these ideas they have been tested in many 
studies (e.g. Hutchens 1986; Adams and Heywood 2007; Heywood et al. 2010; Daniel and 
Heywood 2005; Hirsch et al. 2000; Zwick, forthcoming; Pfeifer 2009). The empirical evidence 
quite consistently confirms the theoretical outcomes according to which firms with deferred 
compensation hire a smaller share of older workers. 
The literature on back-loaded compensation also deals with the different kind of hiring behaviour of 
large and small firms. Long employment contracts are likely to be more important for large firms. 
This relates e.g. to the preconception that large firms typically invest more in firm-specific human 
capital introducing higher fixed training costs. Furthermore, the larger internal labour markets make 
it easier and also profitable to have long tenures. One may also assume that in larger firms the 
monitoring costs rise above the similar costs in smaller firms making the steeper wage-tenure 
profiles more likely. All in all, on theoretical grounds larger firms would be less likely to hire old 
employees than small firms. While some empirical evidence gives support to this reasoning (e.g. Hu 
2003; Adams and Heywood 2007), there is also evidence pointing to the opposite direction 
(Heywood et al., 2010). 
There are also some studies that put more emphasis on institutional arrangements that may hamper 
the hiring opportunities of older employees. The relevant institutional arrangements include health 
and pension insurance systems and also employment protection and anti discrimination legislation 
(see e.g. Scott et al. 1995; Garen et al. 1996; Daniel and Siebert 2005; Adams 2004; Behaghel et al. 
2008). While these policies may have well-founded welfare motivations, they may introduce as by-
products negative implications for the hiring prospects of older employees. Particularly, they may 
increase the costs of new potential recruits adding to the problem of wage-productivity gap among 
the older employees.  
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The results of the relevant empirical studies generally confirm the view that the policies in question 
can indeed have harmful effects on hiring prospects.1 On the other hand, the magnitude of these 
effects is naturally dependent on the actual implementation of the schemes. In the case of the 
pension schemes, for instance, the relevant question is to what extent also the employer-provided 
pension plan is back-loaded. 
3. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: REMOVING BARRIERS  
 TO LONGER WORKING CAREERS  
Finland has witnessed a clear change in pension policy during the last 15 years. The aim has been to 
lengthen working careers and the most distinct elements of this change are the restrictions in early 
retirement options. Simultaneously employment of ageing workers has increased at record speed 
among EU15 countries since the late 1990s until mid 2000s (Ilmakunnas and Takala 2005). The 
improvements in employment rates were manifested both in the age groups 55-59 and 60-64. 
In the early 1990s Finland still was a typical example of early exit culture and the exit routes were 
many-fold. They were related to: (i) disability (three different schemes), (ii) unemployment (so-
called unemployment tunnel with extended UI benefits plus unemployment pension), and (iii) 
reduction of working hours (part-time pension). Step by step the policy has been shifted away from 
the early exit culture (Ilmakunnas and Takala 2005). The lower age limits of early retirement 
schemes have been raised and the early exit routes have become economically less tempting to both 
employees and their employers. In short, these reforms have made the easy ways to discontinue the 
current employment contract less seldom available and economically less beneficial to both sides. 
The effects of these restrictions on exit rates from work to unemployment and early retirement and 
on exit routes from unemployment have been studied at the individual level (Hakola and Uusitalo 
2005; Kyyrä and Wilke 2007; Kyyrä and Ollikainen, 2008). The above studies have indicated that 
these reforms have postponed withdrawals from the labour market and the outflow rates from 
employment to unemployment and to early-retirement schemes have diminished remarkably during 
this period.  
                                                 
 
1 See Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) for references on the research dealing with hiring of older employees where 
policy changes have been used for obtaining exogenous variation in the costs (or incentives) of hiring older employees. 
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These results are in line with the original motivation of the policy reforms which have aimed at the 
continuation of existing employment contracts. While the effects on recruitments have not been the 
primary motivation, the hiring decisions can also be affected by the reforms. The effects on hirings 
stem from the fact that the removals of early retirement options are likely to lengthen the expected 
working careers of the potential older recruits. This implies, among other things, that the hiring 
costs are then less harmful for the firm because these costs can be recouped during a longer period 
(Saint-Paul 2009). Also Hairault et al. (2010) have argued that the time to retirement determines to 
a large extent the value of an employment contract.  
For the above reasons we set the hypothesis that the restrictive changes in early exit policies are 
also reflected in improved hiring prospects for older employees. However, empirical analysis is 
needed because there might be other forces working in other direction. For instance, firms have 
used the early exit options as an easy way to lay off employees in periods of declining demand. The 
restrictions have hit especially those exit routes where the firms have acted as a “gatekeeper”, i.e. 
where the decisions on the use of the routes have mostly been made by the firm. This abolition of 
the possibilities for easy work force reductions may actually make firms more reserved to hire older 
workers. We are interested in the trends in the hiring of older workers over a long time period 
during which several reforms have happened. Therefore we cannot use the reforms as “natural 
experiments”. Such analysis would require attention to a narrowly defined time period (see 
Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2011). 
In addition to changes in hiring trends we are also interested to the recruitment patterns in firms of 
different size. The motivation for this raises from experience rating, whereby firms above certain 
size thresholds directly cover a predetermined share of pension outlays between early retirement 
and start of old age pension of their employees (see Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2011). The 
motivation for this kind of financing structure is to discourage especially the larger firms from 
inefficiently overusing early retirement as a tool of labour adjustment. While experience rating may 
indeed reduce exits to early retirement channels, it may at the same time make bigger firms more 
cautious in hiring of older workers. 
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4. THE DATA AND KEY VARIABLES 
We use data drawn from the Finnish Linked Employer–Employee Data (FLEED) 1990 - 2004, 
which include information on plants and firms and the employees who can be linked to their 
employer. The FLEED data set merges comprehensive administrative records of all labour force 
participants in Finland as well as all employers (firms and their plants) subject to value added tax. 
The data on individuals cover the whole working age population and have information (code) of the 
employer plant and firm of the individuals at the end of the year. The codes allow linking of data on 
individuals to employers with near-perfect tractability over time.  
We use a sample of FLEED, with such information on firms and plants that guarantees that the 
employers cannot be identified. The sample data cover the years from 1990 to 2004. Every third 
individual in age group 16-69 years is randomly included in the sample in the year 1990. This 
sample includes ca. 1 million individuals. For these individuals, all information from the subsequent 
years 1991-2004 is included. Starting from 1991, in each year a third of all 16 years old persons are 
selected to the sample and these individuals are included in the sample in all subsequent years. For 
each individual in each year, the data on the plant and firm that she is working in is included. As a 
result, the plant and firm panels cover practically the whole populations of plants and firms for all 
the years, but the person panel is a sample.  
There have been many ways to form the variable to be explained in econometric work in earlier 
research in which the age structure of hiring has been analyzed. If the analysis is carried out at the 
firm or plant level one can either relate the number of old hires (the definition of old varies) (i) to 
the total number of people hired, (ii) to older existing employees within the firm, or (iii) to the total 
number of the personnel. Newly hired workers are typically defined as those hired during the 
previous year or during the previous few (often last 1-5) years. In addition to the firm-level analyses 
another approach has been to use individual-level data on new hires and explain the probability that 
a new hire is old (e.g. Scott et al. 1995; Adams and Heywood 2007). We use firm-level data and 
measures that are close to (i) and (ii) above. Further, we concentrate on hiring during the previous 
year and we will subsequently call the age group 50-64 “old” employees. 
The main variables of interest are the flows of employees to and from firms. We analyse them both 
at the level of the whole private non-farm business sector and at the firm level. The flows are 
disaggregated by age. We use the age division 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-64 years. We thus leave 
out the youngest (below 20) and oldest (above 64). To obtain more observations per firm (as in 
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many cases the number of hired employees is small, especially when we disaggregate hiring by age) 
we keep only the firms with at least ten employees in the total data although they may have less 
than ten observations in our sample data.  
We use two measures for age-related hiring rates. The first is the share of an age group in hiring, 
jt th / h , where hjt is the number of hired employees (from unemployment, out of labour force, or 
other jobs) between t-1 and t of age j in t and ht is total hiring. The age is based on age in year t, so 
the hiring of 50-64 year olds, for example, counts those who were 49-63 years old in year t-1. 
Similarly we define the shares of an age group in exit (to unemployment, out of labour force, or 
other jobs) and the stock of employees as jt te / e  and jt tn / n , respectively. The second measure is 
the hiring (and exit) rate of an age group. The hiring rate for age group j in year t is jjt n/h , where 
the denominator 2/)( 1, jttjj nnn += −  is the two-year average number of employees in the age 
group. Correspondingly, the exit rate is jjt n/e , where ejt is the exit in age group j.  
Using the average employment in the denominator in the rates, we can treat the hiring and exit rates 
symmetrically. However, the difference of the age group hiring and exit rates does not give the rate 
of change in the age group, since the number of employees in a group also changes through the 
ageing of the staying employees. For example, those who were 64 years old last year no longer 
belong to the group 50-64 this year, whereas those who were 49 years old last year, now belong to 
that group. The change in employment in the 50-64 age group can be expressed as 
)n(ne hn ,t-,t-,t-,t-,t- 164149645064506450 −+−=∆ . Dividing this expression by the average employment 
6450−n gives us the rate of change in the age group. It is decomposed to the difference of the hiring 
and exit rates plus the “cohort effect”, which is the difference of the 49-year olds and 64-year olds 
last year in relation to average employment in group 50-64:2  
6450164149645064506450645064506450 -,t-,t--,t--,t--,t- n)/n(n n/en/ h n/n −+−=∆   (1) 
Similar expressions can be written for the other age groups. Note that the difference of hiring and 
exit is the change in employment for a cohort that was 49-63 years old in t-1 and 50-64 years old in 
t, whereas the whole equation (1) compares 50-64 year olds in t to 50-64 year olds in t-1.  
                                                 
 
2 Note that the cohort effect is related not only to cohort sizes, but also to labor market attachment of different cohorts at 
different ages. 
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5. AGE SEGREGATION AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
To gain insights on the firms’ hiring behaviour of older employees, we illustrate in Figure 1 the 
distribution of hiring across firms with segregation curves. Firms with at least ten employees are 
first ordered according to the ratio of old (50-64) employees and young (20-49) employees, 
separately for stocks, exits, and hires. Then the cumulative share of younger employees is plotted 
against the cumulative share of older employees. If the distribution of older and younger employees 
is the same in all firms, the curves would lie along the 45 degree line. The further the curves are 
from the line, the more segregation there is. The curves are shown for the years 1994 and 2004. The 
area between the 45 degree line and a segregation curve is the Gini index G for segregation. 
Normalizing the area of the triangle to unity, the index is between zero and one. In practice, we 
calculate the Gini index as 11G −∑∑ −= ii ii ii- YXYX , where X and Y are the cumulative shares of the 
young and old, respectively, and i is the rank of the firm in the ordering (Duncan and Duncan, 
1955). The left panel of Figure 2 shows the development of the Gini indices of the stock, exits, and 
hiring of older employees over time. 
Figure 1. Age segregation curves. 
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Figure 2. Time series of Gini indices. 
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Two conclusions can be drawn from the graphs. First, hirings of older employees are much more 
segregated than exits and they both are in turn more segregated than the stock of older employees. 
Roughly 50 percent of hirings of below 50 year old employees have happened in firms that did not 
hire older employees (in the sample data). Second, over time the stock and especially exits of older 
employees have become more segregated, but there has not been much change in hiring 
segregation. As a result, the curves in Figure 1 are closer to each other in 2004 than in 1994, and the 
curves in the left panel of Figure 2 showing the Gini indices for exits and stocks have positive 
trends. In the 2000s segregation has no longer increased. 
It has been argued that the Gini index may give a misleading picture of segregation when the units 
are small (Carrington and Troske, 1997). In our case the index is calculated comparing segregation 
to the case, where the share of old is the same in all firms (i.e., the 45 degree lines in Figure 1). 
However, we have a relatively small number of observations of old hires and exits for the smaller 
firms, and it may not be possible to have exactly the same share of old and young as in the 
aggregate data. An alternative comparison is the case of random allocation of the employees to 
firms, which can generate uneven distribution without being segregation. Carrington and Troske 
(1997) suggest a modification to the Gini index. It is the area between the original segregation curve 
and a corresponding curve of randomness (obtained from random reshuffle of employees to firms) 
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as a proportion of the whole area under the curve of randomness. In practice, this is obtained by 
calculating a Gini index G* for the curve of randomness and modifying the original Gini index G as 
(G-G*)/(1-G*). We have calculated the Gini indices also in this way, doing the reshuffle separately 
for the stocks, hires, and exits 100 times each year. The value of G* used in the adjustment was the 
mean of the Gini indices from the reshuffles for each year. Figure 3 shows segregation curves that 
correspond to one specific reshuffle for each variable in 1994 and 2004. The right hand panel of 
Figure 2 shows the adjusted Gini indices.  
Figure 3. Age segregation curves, random allocation of workers. 
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In Figure 3 the random allocation graphs are below the 45 degree line, showing that part of the 
observed segregation may indeed be a result of random factors. Even with random reallocation of 
workers, hires and exits are more age segregated than the stocks of workers. Interestingly, there is 
not much difference between hires and exits in Figure 3, whereas the difference in their segregation 
was clearly visible in Figure 1. The values of the adjusted Gini indices in the right hand panel of 
Figure 2 are lower than the unadjusted ones in the left hand panel, and the differences are 
significant. If the adjusted index G* is calculated separately for each reshuffle, the 99 percent 
interval around the mean of the index is such that the index G calculated from the actual data is 
outside the interval. This holds for all of the variables (hirings, exits, stocks) in all of the years. The 
trends and changes in the curves are very similar. Our conclusions on the development of 
segregation over time are therefore not sensitive to small units. The relative degrees of segregation 
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of stocks, hires, and exits, are, however, slightly different, as the adjustment has less impact on the 
Gini indices of hiring than on the indices for exits and stocks. The adjusted indices reinforce the 
impression that hirings are much more age segregated than exits or the stocks of workers. 
6.  TRENDS IN AGGREGATE DATA 
In the analysis of the aggregate flows our first interest is in the shares of the age groups in total 
hirings and exits. Then we turn to analysing the corresponding rates where the flows are calculated 
in relation to the number of the employed in that particular age group. Finally, we decompose 
changes in employment in different age groups. There our aim is to consider especially the relative 
roles of hirings, exits and varying cohort sizes behind the increasing employment rates among older 
work force.  
Figures 4 and 5 show the development of the shares of different age groups of the stocks, hirings, 
and exits of employees. The figures show the same information expressed in a slightly different 
way. In Figure 4 we compare the age groups for different flows separately, whereas in Figure 5 we 
compare the flows for each age group separately.  
Figure 4 reveals that young employees tend to be the most mobile. The youngest age group 
accounts for a high share of hires and that share has increased over time. The young also have a 
fairly high share of exits. Especially the hiring shares show clearly the decreasing mobility by age. 
The stock shares of the age groups are closer to each other and the shares have converged over time. 
Part of the variation in the shares is the results of demographics as the baby boom cohorts born in 
the late 1940s and beginning of 1950s are larger than the younger cohorts.  
 
 
 
14
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
20-29 30-39
40-49 50-64
Stock Hires Exits
Shares by age group
Figure 4. Age group shares by type of flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Shares of flows by age group. 
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From Figure 5 we can see that the youngest age group 20-29 is overrepresented both in hiring and 
exits, compared to its share in the number of employees. Interestingly, in the age group 30-39 the 
hiring, exit, and stock shares are almost equal. The 40-49 year olds have a lower share of mobility 
than what their stock share is. The oldest age group 50-64 is underrepresented especially in hiring. 
Although there is an upward trend in the hiring share, it is much weaker than the trend in the stock 
share. This shows that although the hiring of older employees to some extent follows the cohort 
size, there are other factors that slow down hiring. These may include lower incentives to hire older 
employees, but also their lower tendency to switch jobs. The exit share of older employees has 
fluctuated much more than the other shares. Especially in the recession experienced in Finland in 
the early 1990s older employees have accounted for a disproportionate share of exits. Although we 
have not separated here the exits by destination, exits to unemployment and retirement are the 
dominant destinations in this age group. The Finnish unemployment pension system has made it 
attractive for firms to concentrate labour shedding to the older workers. Naturally, the exit share of 
the old is close to their stock share, as this age group represents the end of the working career for 
most employees. 
Figure 6 shows the hiring and exit rates and the decomposition of the rate of employment change to 
the “cohort effect” and the difference of hiring and exit rates. The hiring rate among the youngest 
shows much variation over time, but with older age variations in the hiring rate become much 
smaller and in the oldest group, 50-64 olds, the exit rate varies clearly more. The recession in the 
early 1990s meant very high exit rates for the older employees, but their hiring rate is very low and 
it shows hardly any cyclical variation. The net effect of hirings and exits declines with age, 
becoming negative among the oldest. However, it has been relatively stable in all of the age groups 
in the 2000s. The “cohort effect” has contributed negatively to employment change in the youngest 
age group 20-29 and positively in the oldest group 50-64, but it is close to zero in the two other 
groups. The 49-year olds with relatively high employment rates entering the oldest age group have 
been larger than the cohorts of the 64-year olds who have left the group. Furthermore, the large 
baby-boom generations born after World War II increased the inflow to the oldest age group in the 
mid 1990s. This effect was strengthened by their employment rates that where typically higher than 
the ones of older cohorts.  
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Figure 6. Decomposition of the rate of employment change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We present regressions where we examine whether the determinants of hiring of older employees 
have changed over time. Our main attention is on the firm size effects. We use both the hiring share 
of older employees and the hiring rate as dependent variables. In all of the estimations we use 
weighting by the two-year average employment (in the sample data) to account for the fact that the 
dependent variables are likely to have higher variances in small firms. 
There are many observations, where the rates are zero. These zero observations are corner solutions, 
as the hiring rates cannot be negative and therefore there is no censoring. In principle we could use 
Tobit models, but they have the disadvantage that the explanatory variables are assumed to have the 
same sign in the determination of non-zero observations and in the continuous part of the model. 
Selection models could account for different effects, but it is hard to justify exclusion restrictions, 
i.e. to find variables that would affect the choice of hiring older employees, but not the choice of 
how many of them to hire. Therefore we use a two-part model where the discrete and continuous 
parts are treated separately. In any case, when weighted estimation is used, the zero observations do 
not matter as much and often OLS for all observations gives more or less the same results as 
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nonlinear models where the selection part and continuous is taken into account at the same time (see 
e.g. Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2005). 
The explanatory variables include several indicator variables: dummy variables for size groups of 
the firms3 (number of employees is 10-19 (reference group), 20-49, 50-99, 100-299, 300-), a 
dummy for foreign ownership (at least 20% share), dummies for exporting and importing plants, 
and dummies for 24 two-digit industries4. There are also several continuous variables: employment 
growth rate, exit rate (or exit share) of employees in the same age group that is used as the 
dependent variable, productivity (log of total factor productivity, lnTFP), average educational years 
(based on standard degree years), average tenure years, and average age of the employees.5 To 
reduce endogeneity concerns, we lag all the continuous variables by one year. In this way the hiring 
rates cannot affect the work force structure, and the other variables do not perfectly coincide with 
the hiring flows which are defined by a comparison to year t-1 situation. 
The time paths of the firm size coefficients are shown in Figure 7. They are based on separate 
annual cross section estimates.6 The group of larger firms has lower hiring shares of the old than the 
smallest firms (size groups 10-19 and 20-49). When we include only positive hiring share 
observations, the hiring rate falls even more clearly with firm size. In all of the size classes the 
hiring rate of old employees has been higher than in the reference group, firm size 10-19, in most of 
the years. There is, however, a downward trend in the coefficients and some of them become 
negative in the 2000s. The differences between firms in different size classes are relatively small. 
Again, using only the positive observations shows a clear, declining relationship between firm size 
and hiring rate of the old. For the discrete part we use a linear probability model. The results show 
that the probability of hiring older employees increases with firm size. The hiring behaviour of 
firms is therefore a product of the higher propensity of the large firms to hire older employees and 
their lower rate of hiring when they hire any.  
 
 
                                                 
 
3 Because of data confidentiality, we have no information on the actual sizes of the firms, but we know the size groups 
they belong to. 
4 Each firm has one or more industries, based on the industries of the plants belonging to the firm. There are enough 
changes in industries and/or plants to identify the industry effects also in fixed effects estimation. 
5 The variables that describe the characteristics of the work force (average education, tenure, and age), labour 
productivity, and employment growth have been calculated from the original FLEED data, i.e. the “total” data and not 
our sample data. 
6 The estimation period starts from 1996, because data on some of the variables are lacking in the earlier years.  
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Table 1 shows the fixed effects estimation results for the whole period 1996-2004. The first two 
columns show the results for the hiring share of older employees, the next two for the hiring rate, 
and the last column for the linear probability model.7  
The firm size coefficients are consistent with the annual cross section results. We have included 
past exit share or past exit rate of older employees to examine whether there is age-related 
replacement hiring. The coefficients of the exit variables are positive and significant in all but one 
of the models. This shows that there is indeed some replacement of exiting older employees by 
other old ones. One interpretation of this is that firms have such tasks that require long experience. 
Past growth is negatively related to the hiring share of the old, but not significant in the models for 
hiring rates. A notable difference to the other models is that according to the linear probability 
model firms that have grown in the past are more likely to hire old employees. It seems that when 
firms grow, they have to rely on more sources of new employees, including the older cohorts. The 
firms, whose hiring needs are smaller, can more easily pick up the kind of age structure they want. 
                                                 
 
7 The number of observations varies in the estimations. The hiring share is not defined when a firm has no hiring and the 
hiring rate is not defined when a firm has not hired older employees and has not had them in the previous year, since the 
denominator of the rate is zero in this case. However, the hiring rate can still be zero when the hiring share does not 
exist (the plant has some older employees, but has not hired anyone), or vice versa (the plant has some hiring, but has 
no older employees). 
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Past productivity has mixed influences, so there is no clear evidence of achievement of high 
productivity requiring a younger work force. 
The results on the work force structure variables are somewhat mixed. Average age of employees is 
negatively related to hiring of the old, except in the model for positive hiring shares. It seems that 
firms want to achieve a balanced age structure. The hiring rates of the old are higher in firms with 
high educational level. Finally, average tenure in the firm is positively related to the hiring rate and 
the probability to hire old workers. The results can be interpreted to show that firms that need an 
educated and experienced work force tend to hire also older applicants. 
The foreign ownership and foreign trade variables can be interpreted as measures of globalization. 
Since they are not significant in any of the estimations, it seems that there is no clear connection 
between globalization trends and the labour market prospects of the older employees. Finally, the 
unreported year effects show that there has been an increase in the hiring share of older employees 
and in the probability to hire any old employees during the data period. This is consistent with the 
policy efforts that have aimed at improving the labour market prospect of ageing workers. However, 
it also reflects cohort effects as the big post-war cohorts have entered the oldest age group, thereby 
increasing their share in the available labour supply. The hiring rate of the older employees has, on 
the other hand, declined during our estimation period. 
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Table 1. Fixed effects estimation results for 1996-2004. 
 
 Hiring share Hiring share, 
positive obs. 
Hiring rate Hiring rate, 
positive obs. 
Linear prob. for 
positive obs. 
20-49 employees 0.009 -0.114*** 0.035*** -0.091*** 0.066*** 
 (0.010) (0.033) (0.008) (0.035) (0.013) 
50-99 employees -0.007 -0.198*** 0.041** -0.274*** 0.144*** 
 (0.013) (0.043) (0.017) (0.066) (0.020) 
100-299 employees -0.015 -0.266*** 0.051* -0.337*** 0.256*** 
 (0.015) (0.048) (0.026) (0.089) (0.030) 
300- employees -0.019 -0.312*** 0.066** -0.371*** 0.420*** 
 (0.017) (0.051) (0.033) (0.111) (0.040) 
Exit rate of 50- old, t-1   0.211*** 0.254***  
   (0.012) (0.018)  
Exit share of 50- old, t-1 0.022*** 0.001   0.060*** 
 (0.007) (0.013)   (0.017) 
Employment change, t-1 -0.013* -0.035** -0.009 -0.021 0.046*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.016) 
Average age, t-1 -0.003** 0.003** -0.010*** -0.021*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Average education, t-1 0.005 0.017 0.068*** 0.193*** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.034) (0.015) 
Average tenure, t-1 0.004 -0.003 0.007* 0.011* 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Productivity, t-1 -0.045** -0.025 0.015 0.096* -0.030 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.029) (0.054) (0.056) 
Foreign -0.000 -0.005 0.003 0.017 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.035) 
Exporter 0.008 0.015 0.012 0.015 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.023) 
Importer -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.012 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) 
N 45865 12170 65664 12903 61261 
R2 within 0.020 0.078 0.097 0.214 0.027 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01. Weighting by the number of employees is 
used in the estimations. Coefficients of year and industry dummies not reported.  
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8.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have investigated the behaviour of firms in hiring of older employees during the time interval 
from 1992 to 2004 in Finland using linked employer-employee data. Our results using segregation 
curves and Gini indices indicate that hiring of older employees is much more segregated than exits, 
which in turn are more segregated than the stock of older employees. During a ten year time interval 
(from 1994 to 2004) the stock and exits of older employees have become more segregated, but 
hiring slightly less segregated. Approximately half of hiring of younger employees happened in 
workplaces that did not hire older employees. We compare the segregation both to the case of even 
allocation of employees (all firms hire or employ the same share of old employees) and to random 
allocation (the old and young employees in the data are randomly reshuffled to firms). Although 
comparison to random allocation shows less segregation, the main results and trends are similar to 
those in the comparison to even allocation. 
There is a positive upward trend in the recruitments of the employees who are 50+. This trend is 
related to the increasing cohort size, but it is much weaker than the trend in the relative share of 
older workers in employment. The exit rate of the older employees indicates cyclical variation 
while the small number of hirings seems to be insensitive to changing labour demand. We also 
present a decomposition of employment by age group to hiring and exits and cohort related factors. 
For example the change in the number of employees in the age group 50-64 can be decomposed to 
hired and exited 50-64 olds, and to cohort differences among the staying employees (difference of 
those who were 49 and those who were 64 last year). The role of the cohort size effects is important 
in the oldest age groups and it is strengthened by the relatively high employment rates among the 
baby-boom generation. 
We have found in a regression analysis that there are differences between different sized firms in 
their hiring behaviour. Larger firms tend to have lower share of old hires and lower hiring rates of 
the old, and there has been a trend over time which increases the gap to the smallest firms. 
However, larger firms have a higher probability to higher any old employees, although when they 
hire, their hiring rate is lower. 
The results also have implications for policies aiming to lengthen the working careers and increase 
the sustainability of pension systems. These targets have made it necessary to restrict the use of 
early retirement. However, it is not enough. Older worker who have become unemployed or who 
want to change their job need to have more employment opportunities than is the case at the 
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moment. Labour and pension policies need to be monitored and designed so that there are more 
incentives for the individual to search for a new job and for the firms to hire older employees.  
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